Otaku-Projects / AngularJS-CRUD-PHP

 * @license AngularJS v1.6.5

 * (c) 2010-2017 Google, Inc. http://angularjs.org

 * License: MIT

 */

(function(window, angular) {'use strict';

/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

 *     Any commits to this file should be reviewed with security in mind.  *

 *   Changes to this file can potentially create security vulnerabilities. *

 *          An approval from 2 Core members with history of modifying      *

 *                         this file is required.                          *

 *                                                                         *

 *  Does the change somehow allow for arbitrary javascript to be executed? *

 *    Or allows for someone to change the prototype of built-in objects?   *

 *     Or gives undesired access to variables likes document or window?    *

 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */

var $sanitizeMinErr = angular.$$minErr('$sanitize');

var bind;

var extend;

var forEach;

var isDefined;

var lowercase;

var noop;

var nodeContains;

var htmlParser;

var htmlSanitizeWriter;

/**

 * @ngdoc module

 * @name ngSanitize

 * @description

 *

 * # ngSanitize

 *

 * The `ngSanitize` module provides functionality to sanitize HTML.

 *

 *

 * <div doc-module-components="ngSanitize"></div>

 *

 * See {@link ngSanitize.$sanitize `$sanitize`} for usage.

 */

/**

 * @ngdoc service

 * @name $sanitize

 * @kind function

 *

 * @description

 *   Sanitizes an html string by stripping all potentially dangerous tokens.

 *

 *   The input is sanitized by parsing the HTML into tokens. All safe tokens (from a whitelist) are

 *   then serialized back to properly escaped html string. This means that no unsafe input can make

 *   it into the returned string.

 *

 *   The whitelist for URL sanitization of attribute values is configured using the functions

 *   `aHrefSanitizationWhitelist` and `imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist` of {@link ng.$compileProvider

 *   `$compileProvider`}.

 *

 *   The input may also contain SVG markup if this is enabled via {@link $sanitizeProvider}.

 *

 * @param {string} html HTML input.

 * @returns {string} Sanitized HTML.

 *

 * @example

   <example module="sanitizeExample" deps="angular-sanitize.js" name="sanitize-service">

   <file name="index.html">

     <script>

         angular.module('sanitizeExample', ['ngSanitize'])

           .controller('ExampleController', ['$scope', '$sce', function($scope, $sce) {

             $scope.snippet =

               '<p style="color:blue">an html\n' +

               '<em onmouseover="this.textContent=\'PWN3D!\'">click here</em>\n' +

               'snippet</p>';

             $scope.deliberatelyTrustDangerousSnippet = function() {

               return $sce.trustAsHtml($scope.snippet);

             };

           }]);

     </script>

     <div ng-controller="ExampleController">

        Snippet: <textarea ng-model="snippet" cols="60" rows="3"></textarea>

       <table>

         <tr>

           <td>Directive</td>

           <td>How</td>

           <td>Source</td>

           <td>Rendered</td>

         </tr>

         <tr id="bind-html-with-sanitize">

           <td>ng-bind-html</td>

           <td>Automatically uses $sanitize</td>

           <td><pre>&lt;div ng-bind-html="snippet"&gt;<br/>&lt;/div&gt;</pre></td>

           <td><div ng-bind-html="snippet"></div></td>

         </tr>

         <tr id="bind-html-with-trust">

           <td>ng-bind-html</td>

           <td>Bypass $sanitize by explicitly trusting the dangerous value</td>

           <td>

           <pre>&lt;div ng-bind-html="deliberatelyTrustDangerousSnippet()"&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;</pre>

           </td>

           <td><div ng-bind-html="deliberatelyTrustDangerousSnippet()"></div></td>

         </tr>

         <tr id="bind-default">

           <td>ng-bind</td>

           <td>Automatically escapes</td>

           <td><pre>&lt;div ng-bind="snippet"&gt;<br/>&lt;/div&gt;</pre></td>

           <td><div ng-bind="snippet"></div></td>

         </tr>

       </table>

       </div>

   </file>

   <file name="protractor.js" type="protractor">

     it('should sanitize the html snippet by default', function() {

       expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-sanitize div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')).

         toBe('<p>an html\n<em>click here</em>\nsnippet</p>');

     });

     it('should inline raw snippet if bound to a trusted value', function() {

       expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-trust div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')).

         toBe("<p style=\"color:blue\">an html\n" +

              "<em onmouseover=\"this.textContent='PWN3D!'\">click here</em>\n" +

              "snippet</p>");

     });

     it('should escape snippet without any filter', function() {

       expect(element(by.css('#bind-default div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')).

         toBe("<p style=\"color:blue\">an html\n" +

              "<em onmouseover=\"this.textContent='PWN3D!'\">click here</em>\n" +

              "snippet</p>");

     });

     it('should update', function() {

       element(by.model('snippet')).clear();

       element(by.model('snippet')).sendKeys('new <b onclick="alert(1)">text</b>');

       expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-sanitize div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')).

         toBe('new <b>text</b>');

       expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-trust div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')).toBe(

         'new <b onclick="alert(1)">text</b>');

       expect(element(by.css('#bind-default div')).getAttribute('innerHTML')).toBe(

         "new <b onclick=\"alert(1)\">text</b>");

     });

   </file>

   </example>

 */

/**

 * @ngdoc provider

 * @name $sanitizeProvider

 * @this

 *

 * @description

 * Creates and configures {@link $sanitize} instance.

 */

function $SanitizeProvider() {

  var svgEnabled = false;

  this.$get = ['$$sanitizeUri', function($$sanitizeUri) {

    if (svgEnabled) {

      extend(validElements, svgElements);

    }

    return function(html) {

      var buf = [];

      htmlParser(html, htmlSanitizeWriter(buf, function(uri, isImage) {

        return !/^unsafe:/.test($$sanitizeUri(uri, isImage));

      }));

      return buf.join('');

    };

  }];

  /**

   * @ngdoc method

   * @name $sanitizeProvider#enableSvg

   * @kind function

   *

   * @description

   * Enables a subset of svg to be supported by the sanitizer.

   *

   * <div class="alert alert-warning">

   *   <p>By enabling this setting without taking other precautions, you might expose your

   *   application to click-hijacking attacks. In these attacks, sanitized svg elements could be positioned

   *   outside of the containing element and be rendered over other elements on the page (e.g. a login

   *   link). Such behavior can then result in phishing incidents.</p>

   *

   *   <p>To protect against these, explicitly setup `overflow: hidden` css rule for all potential svg

   *   tags within the sanitized content:</p>

   *

   *   <br>

   *

   *   <pre><code>

   *   .rootOfTheIncludedContent svg {

   *     overflow: hidden !important;

   *   }

   *   </code></pre>

   * </div>

   *

   * @param {boolean=} flag Enable or disable SVG support in the sanitizer.

   * @returns {boolean|ng.$sanitizeProvider} Returns the currently configured value if called

   *    without an argument or self for chaining otherwise.

   */

  this.enableSvg = function(enableSvg) {

    if (isDefined(enableSvg)) {

      svgEnabled = enableSvg;

      return this;

      return svgEnabled;

    }

  };

  //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////

  // Private stuff

  //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////

  bind = angular.bind;

  extend = angular.extend;

  forEach = angular.forEach;

  isDefined = angular.isDefined;

  lowercase = angular.lowercase;

  noop = angular.noop;

  htmlParser = htmlParserImpl;

  htmlSanitizeWriter = htmlSanitizeWriterImpl;

  nodeContains = window.Node.prototype.contains || /** @this */ function(arg) {

    // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise

    return !!(this.compareDocumentPosition(arg) & 16);

  };

  // Regular Expressions for parsing tags and attributes

  var SURROGATE_PAIR_REGEXP = /[\uD800-\uDBFF][\uDC00-\uDFFF]/g,

    // Match everything outside of normal chars and " (quote character)

    NON_ALPHANUMERIC_REGEXP = /([^#-~ |!])/g;

  // Good source of info about elements and attributes

  // http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#semantics

  // http://simon.html5.org/html-elements

  // Safe Void Elements - HTML5

  // http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#void-elements

  var voidElements = toMap('area,br,col,hr,img,wbr');

  // Elements that you can, intentionally, leave open (and which close themselves)

  // http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#optional-tags

  var optionalEndTagBlockElements = toMap('colgroup,dd,dt,li,p,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,tr'),

      optionalEndTagInlineElements = toMap('rp,rt'),

      optionalEndTagElements = extend({},

                                              optionalEndTagInlineElements,

                                              optionalEndTagBlockElements);

  // Safe Block Elements - HTML5

  var blockElements = extend({}, optionalEndTagBlockElements, toMap('address,article,' +

          'aside,blockquote,caption,center,del,dir,div,dl,figure,figcaption,footer,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,' +

          'h6,header,hgroup,hr,ins,map,menu,nav,ol,pre,section,table,ul'));

  // Inline Elements - HTML5

  var inlineElements = extend({}, optionalEndTagInlineElements, toMap('a,abbr,acronym,b,' +

          'bdi,bdo,big,br,cite,code,del,dfn,em,font,i,img,ins,kbd,label,map,mark,q,ruby,rp,rt,s,' +

          'samp,small,span,strike,strong,sub,sup,time,tt,u,var'));

  // SVG Elements

  // https://wiki.whatwg.org/wiki/Sanitization_rules#svg_Elements

  // Note: the elements animate,animateColor,animateMotion,animateTransform,set are intentionally omitted.

  // They can potentially allow for arbitrary javascript to be executed. See #11290

  var svgElements = toMap('circle,defs,desc,ellipse,font-face,font-face-name,font-face-src,g,glyph,' +

          'hkern,image,linearGradient,line,marker,metadata,missing-glyph,mpath,path,polygon,polyline,' +

          'radialGradient,rect,stop,svg,switch,text,title,tspan');

  // Blocked Elements (will be stripped)

  var blockedElements = toMap('script,style');

  var validElements = extend({},

                                     voidElements,

                                     blockElements,

                                     inlineElements,

                                     optionalEndTagElements);

  //Attributes that have href and hence need to be sanitized

  var uriAttrs = toMap('background,cite,href,longdesc,src,xlink:href');

  var htmlAttrs = toMap('abbr,align,alt,axis,bgcolor,border,cellpadding,cellspacing,class,clear,' +

      'color,cols,colspan,compact,coords,dir,face,headers,height,hreflang,hspace,' +

      'ismap,lang,language,nohref,nowrap,rel,rev,rows,rowspan,rules,' +

      'scope,scrolling,shape,size,span,start,summary,tabindex,target,title,type,' +

      'valign,value,vspace,width');

  // SVG attributes (without "id" and "name" attributes)

  // https://wiki.whatwg.org/wiki/Sanitization_rules#svg_Attributes

  var svgAttrs = toMap('accent-height,accumulate,additive,alphabetic,arabic-form,ascent,' +

      'baseProfile,bbox,begin,by,calcMode,cap-height,class,color,color-rendering,content,' +

      'cx,cy,d,dx,dy,descent,display,dur,end,fill,fill-rule,font-family,font-size,font-stretch,' +

      'font-style,font-variant,font-weight,from,fx,fy,g1,g2,glyph-name,gradientUnits,hanging,' +

      'height,horiz-adv-x,horiz-origin-x,ideographic,k,keyPoints,keySplines,keyTimes,lang,' +

      'marker-end,marker-mid,marker-start,markerHeight,markerUnits,markerWidth,mathematical,' +

      'max,min,offset,opacity,orient,origin,overline-position,overline-thickness,panose-1,' +

      'path,pathLength,points,preserveAspectRatio,r,refX,refY,repeatCount,repeatDur,' +

      'requiredExtensions,requiredFeatures,restart,rotate,rx,ry,slope,stemh,stemv,stop-color,' +

      'stop-opacity,strikethrough-position,strikethrough-thickness,stroke,stroke-dasharray,' +

      'stroke-dashoffset,stroke-linecap,stroke-linejoin,stroke-miterlimit,stroke-opacity,' +

      'stroke-width,systemLanguage,target,text-anchor,to,transform,type,u1,u2,underline-position,' +

      'underline-thickness,unicode,unicode-range,units-per-em,values,version,viewBox,visibility,' +

      'width,widths,x,x-height,x1,x2,xlink:actuate,xlink:arcrole,xlink:role,xlink:show,xlink:title,' +

      'xlink:type,xml:base,xml:lang,xml:space,xmlns,xmlns:xlink,y,y1,y2,zoomAndPan', true);

  var validAttrs = extend({},

                                  uriAttrs,

                                  svgAttrs,

                                  htmlAttrs);

  function toMap(str, lowercaseKeys) {

    var obj = {}, items = str.split(','), i;

    for (i = 0; i < items.length; i++) {

      obj[lowercaseKeys ? lowercase(items[i]) : items[i]] = true;

    }

    return obj;

  }

  /**

   * Create an inert document that contains the dirty HTML that needs sanitizing

   * Depending upon browser support we use one of three strategies for doing this.

   * Support: Safari 10.x -> XHR strategy

   * Support: Firefox -> DomParser strategy

   */

  var getInertBodyElement /* function(html: string): HTMLBodyElement */ = (function(window, document) {

    var inertDocument;

    if (document && document.implementation) {

      inertDocument = document.implementation.createHTMLDocument('inert');

    } else {

      throw $sanitizeMinErr('noinert', 'Can\'t create an inert html document');

    }

    var inertBodyElement = (inertDocument.documentElement || inertDocument.getDocumentElement()).querySelector('body');

    // Check for the Safari 10.1 bug - which allows JS to run inside the SVG G element

    inertBodyElement.innerHTML = '<svg><g onload="this.parentNode.remove()"></g></svg>';

    if (!inertBodyElement.querySelector('svg')) {

      return getInertBodyElement_XHR;

      // Check for the Firefox bug - which prevents the inner img JS from being sanitized

      inertBodyElement.innerHTML = '<svg><p><style><img src="</style><img src=x onerror=alert(1)//">';

      if (inertBodyElement.querySelector('svg img')) {

        return getInertBodyElement_DOMParser;

        return getInertBodyElement_InertDocument;

      }

    }

    function getInertBodyElement_XHR(html) {

      // We add this dummy element to ensure that the rest of the content is parsed as expected

      // e.g. leading whitespace is maintained and tags like `<meta>` do not get hoisted to the `<head>` tag.

      html = '<remove></remove>' + html;

      try {

        html = encodeURI(html);

      } catch (e) {

        return undefined;

      }

      var xhr = new window.XMLHttpRequest();

      xhr.responseType = 'document';

      xhr.open('GET', 'data:text/html;charset=utf-8,' + html, false);

      xhr.send(null);

      var body = xhr.response.body;

      body.firstChild.remove();

      return body;

    }

    function getInertBodyElement_DOMParser(html) {

      // We add this dummy element to ensure that the rest of the content is parsed as expected

      // e.g. leading whitespace is maintained and tags like `<meta>` do not get hoisted to the `<head>` tag.

      html = '<remove></remove>' + html;

      try {

        var body = new window.DOMParser().parseFromString(html, 'text/html').body;

        body.firstChild.remove();

        return body;

      } catch (e) {

        return undefined;

      }

    }

    function getInertBodyElement_InertDocument(html) {

      inertBodyElement.innerHTML = html;

      // Support: IE 9-11 only

      // strip custom-namespaced attributes on IE<=11

      if (document.documentMode) {

        stripCustomNsAttrs(inertBodyElement);

      }

      return inertBodyElement;

    }

  })(window, window.document);

  /**

   * @example

   * htmlParser(htmlString, {

   *     start: function(tag, attrs) {},

   *     end: function(tag) {},

   *     chars: function(text) {},

   *     comment: function(text) {}

   * });

   *

   * @param {string} html string

   * @param {object} handler

   */

  function htmlParserImpl(html, handler) {

    if (html === null || html === undefined) {

      html = '';

    } else if (typeof html !== 'string') {

      html = '' + html;

    }

    var inertBodyElement = getInertBodyElement(html);

    if (!inertBodyElement) return '';

    //mXSS protection

    var mXSSAttempts = 5;

    do {

      if (mXSSAttempts === 0) {

        throw $sanitizeMinErr('uinput', 'Failed to sanitize html because the input is unstable');

      }

      mXSSAttempts--;

      // trigger mXSS if it is going to happen by reading and writing the innerHTML

      html = inertBodyElement.innerHTML;

      inertBodyElement = getInertBodyElement(html);

    } while (html !== inertBodyElement.innerHTML);

    var node = inertBodyElement.firstChild;

      switch (node.nodeType) {

        case 1: // ELEMENT_NODE

          handler.start(node.nodeName.toLowerCase(), attrToMap(node.attributes));

          break;

        case 3: // TEXT NODE

          handler.chars(node.textContent);

          break;

      }

      var nextNode;

      if (!(nextNode = node.firstChild)) {

        if (node.nodeType === 1) {

          handler.end(node.nodeName.toLowerCase());

        }

        nextNode = getNonDescendant('nextSibling', node);

        if (!nextNode) {

          while (nextNode == null) {

            node = getNonDescendant('parentNode', node);

            if (node === inertBodyElement) break;

            nextNode = getNonDescendant('nextSibling', node);

            if (node.nodeType === 1) {

              handler.end(node.nodeName.toLowerCase());

            }

          }

        }

      }

      node = nextNode;

    }

    while ((node = inertBodyElement.firstChild)) {

      inertBodyElement.removeChild(node);

    }

  }

  function attrToMap(attrs) {

    var map = {};

    for (var i = 0, ii = attrs.length; i < ii; i++) {

      var attr = attrs[i];

      map[attr.name] = attr.value;

    }

    return map;

  }

  /**

   * Escapes all potentially dangerous characters, so that the

   * resulting string can be safely inserted into attribute or

   * element text.

   * @param value

   * @returns {string} escaped text

   */

    return value.

      replace(/&/g, '&').

      replace(SURROGATE_PAIR_REGEXP, function(value) {

        var hi = value.charCodeAt(0);

        var low = value.charCodeAt(1);

        return '&#' + (((hi - 0xD800) * 0x400) + (low - 0xDC00) + 0x10000) + ';';

      }).

      replace(NON_ALPHANUMERIC_REGEXP, function(value) {

        return '&#' + value.charCodeAt(0) + ';';

      }).

      replace(/</g, '&lt;').

      replace(/>/g, '>');

  }

  /**

   * create an HTML/XML writer which writes to buffer

   * @param {Array} buf use buf.join('') to get out sanitized html string

   * @returns {object} in the form of {

   *     start: function(tag, attrs) {},

   *     end: function(tag) {},

   *     chars: function(text) {},

   *     comment: function(text) {}

   * }

   */

    var ignoreCurrentElement = false;

    var out = bind(buf, buf.push);

    return {

      start: function(tag, attrs) {

        tag = lowercase(tag);

        if (!ignoreCurrentElement && blockedElements[tag]) {

          ignoreCurrentElement = tag;

        }

        if (!ignoreCurrentElement && validElements[tag] === true) {

          out('<');

          out(tag);

          forEach(attrs, function(value, key) {

            var lkey = lowercase(key);

            var isImage = (tag === 'img' && lkey === 'src') || (lkey === 'background');

            if (validAttrs[lkey] === true &&

              (uriAttrs[lkey] !== true || uriValidator(value, isImage))) {

              out(' ');

              out(key);

              out('="');

              out(encodeEntities(value));

              out('"');

            }

          });

          out('>');

        }

      },

      end: function(tag) {

        tag = lowercase(tag);

        if (!ignoreCurrentElement && validElements[tag] === true && voidElements[tag] !== true) {

          out('</');

          out(tag);

          out('>');

        }

        // eslint-disable-next-line eqeqeq

        if (tag == ignoreCurrentElement) {

          ignoreCurrentElement = false;

        }

      },

      chars: function(chars) {

        if (!ignoreCurrentElement) {

          out(encodeEntities(chars));

        }

      }

    };

  }

  /**

   * When IE9-11 comes across an unknown namespaced attribute e.g. 'xlink:foo' it adds 'xmlns:ns1' attribute to declare

   * ns1 namespace and prefixes the attribute with 'ns1' (e.g. 'ns1:xlink:foo'). This is undesirable since we don't want

   * to allow any of these custom attributes. This method strips them all.

   *

   * @param node Root element to process

   */

    while (node) {

      if (node.nodeType === window.Node.ELEMENT_NODE) {

        var attrs = node.attributes;

        for (var i = 0, l = attrs.length; i < l; i++) {

          var attrNode = attrs[i];

          var attrName = attrNode.name.toLowerCase();

          if (attrName === 'xmlns:ns1' || attrName.lastIndexOf('ns1:', 0) === 0) {

            node.removeAttributeNode(attrNode);

            l--;

          }

        }

      }

      var nextNode = node.firstChild;

      if (nextNode) {

        stripCustomNsAttrs(nextNode);

      }

      node = getNonDescendant('nextSibling', node);

    }

  }

  function getNonDescendant(propName, node) {

    // An element is clobbered if its `propName` property points to one of its descendants

    var nextNode = node[propName];

    if (nextNode && nodeContains.call(node, nextNode)) {

      throw $sanitizeMinErr('elclob', 'Failed to sanitize html because the element is clobbered: {0}', node.outerHTML || node.outerText);

    }

    return nextNode;

  }

}

function sanitizeText(chars) {

  var buf = [];

  var writer = htmlSanitizeWriter(buf, noop);

  writer.chars(chars);

  return buf.join('');

}

// define ngSanitize module and register $sanitize service

angular.module('ngSanitize', [])

  .provider('$sanitize', $SanitizeProvider)

  .info({ angularVersion: '1.6.5' });

/**

 * @ngdoc filter

 * @name linky

 * @kind function

 *

 * @description

 * Finds links in text input and turns them into html links. Supports `http/https/ftp/mailto` and

 * plain email address links.

 *

 * Requires the {@link ngSanitize `ngSanitize`} module to be installed.

 *

 * @param {string} text Input text.

 * @param {string} target Window (`_blank|_self|_parent|_top`) or named frame to open links in.

 * @param {object|function(url)} [attributes] Add custom attributes to the link element.

 *

 *    Can be one of:

 *

 *    - `object`: A map of attributes

 *    - `function`: Takes the url as a parameter and returns a map of attributes

 *

 *    If the map of attributes contains a value for `target`, it overrides the value of

 *    the target parameter.

 *

 *

 * @returns {string} Html-linkified and {@link $sanitize sanitized} text.

 *

 * @usage

   <span ng-bind-html="linky_expression | linky"></span>

 *

 * @example

   <example module="linkyExample" deps="angular-sanitize.js" name="linky-filter">

     <file name="index.html">

       <div ng-controller="ExampleController">

       Snippet: <textarea ng-model="snippet" cols="60" rows="3"></textarea>

       <table>

         <tr>

           <th>Filter</th>

           <th>Source</th>

           <th>Rendered</th>

         </tr>

         <tr id="linky-filter">

           <td>linky filter</td>

           <td>

             <pre>&lt;div ng-bind-html="snippet | linky"&gt;<br>&lt;/div&gt;</pre>

           </td>

           <td>

             <div ng-bind-html="snippet | linky"></div>

           </td>

         </tr>

         <tr id="linky-target">

          <td>linky target</td>

          <td>

            <pre>&lt;div ng-bind-html="snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_blank'"&gt;<br>&lt;/div&gt;</pre>

          </td>

          <td>

            <div ng-bind-html="snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_blank'"></div>

          </td>

         </tr>

         <tr id="linky-custom-attributes">

          <td>linky custom attributes</td>

          <td>

            <pre>&lt;div ng-bind-html="snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_self':{rel: 'nofollow'}"&gt;<br>&lt;/div&gt;</pre>

          </td>

          <td>

            <div ng-bind-html="snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_self':{rel: 'nofollow'}"></div>

          </td>

         </tr>

         <tr id="escaped-html">

           <td>no filter</td>

           <td><pre>&lt;div ng-bind="snippet"&gt;<br>&lt;/div&gt;</pre></td>

           <td><div ng-bind="snippet"></div></td>

         </tr>

       </table>

     </file>

     <file name="script.js">

       angular.module('linkyExample', ['ngSanitize'])

         .controller('ExampleController', ['$scope', function($scope) {

           $scope.snippet =

             'Pretty text with some links:\n' +

             'http://angularjs.org/,\n' +

             'mailto:[email protected],\n' +

             '[email protected],\n' +

             'and one more: ftp://127.0.0.1/.';

           $scope.snippetWithSingleURL = 'http://angularjs.org/';

         }]);

     </file>

     <file name="protractor.js" type="protractor">

       it('should linkify the snippet with urls', function() {

         expect(element(by.id('linky-filter')).element(by.binding('snippet | linky')).getText()).

             toBe('Pretty text with some links: http://angularjs.org/, [email protected], ' +

                  '[email protected], and one more: ftp://127.0.0.1/.');

         expect(element.all(by.css('#linky-filter a')).count()).toEqual(4);

       });

       it('should not linkify snippet without the linky filter', function() {

         expect(element(by.id('escaped-html')).element(by.binding('snippet')).getText()).

             toBe('Pretty text with some links: http://angularjs.org/, mailto:[email protected], ' +

                  '[email protected], and one more: ftp://127.0.0.1/.');

         expect(element.all(by.css('#escaped-html a')).count()).toEqual(0);

       });

       it('should update', function() {

         element(by.model('snippet')).clear();

         element(by.model('snippet')).sendKeys('new http://link.');

         expect(element(by.id('linky-filter')).element(by.binding('snippet | linky')).getText()).

             toBe('new http://link.');

         expect(element.all(by.css('#linky-filter a')).count()).toEqual(1);

         expect(element(by.id('escaped-html')).element(by.binding('snippet')).getText())

             .toBe('new http://link.');

       });

       it('should work with the target property', function() {

        expect(element(by.id('linky-target')).

            element(by.binding("snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_blank'")).getText()).

            toBe('http://angularjs.org/');

        expect(element(by.css('#linky-target a')).getAttribute('target')).toEqual('_blank');

       });

       it('should optionally add custom attributes', function() {

        expect(element(by.id('linky-custom-attributes')).

            element(by.binding("snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_self':{rel: 'nofollow'}")).getText()).

            toBe('http://angularjs.org/');

        expect(element(by.css('#linky-custom-attributes a')).getAttribute('rel')).toEqual('nofollow');

       });

     </file>

   </example>

 */

  var LINKY_URL_REGEXP =

        /((ftp|https?):\/\/|(www\.)|(mailto:)?[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@)\S*[^\s.;,(){}<>"\u201d\u2019]/i,

      MAILTO_REGEXP = /^mailto:/i;

  var linkyMinErr = angular.$$minErr('linky');

  var isDefined = angular.isDefined;

  var isFunction = angular.isFunction;

  var isObject = angular.isObject;

  var isString = angular.isString;

  return function(text, target, attributes) {

    if (text == null || text === '') return text;

    if (!isString(text)) throw linkyMinErr('notstring', 'Expected string but received: {0}', text);

    var attributesFn =

      isFunction(attributes) ? attributes :

      isObject(attributes) ? function getAttributesObject() {return attributes;} :

    var match;

    var raw = text;

    var html = [];

    var url;

    var i;

    while ((match = raw.match(LINKY_URL_REGEXP))) {

      // We can not end in these as they are sometimes found at the end of the sentence

      url = match[0];

      // if we did not match ftp/http/www/mailto then assume mailto

      if (!match[2] && !match[4]) {

        url = (match[3] ? 'http://' : 'mailto:') + url;

      }

      i = match.index;

      addText(raw.substr(0, i));

      addLink(url, match[0].replace(MAILTO_REGEXP, ''));

      raw = raw.substring(i + match[0].length);

    }

    addText(raw);

    return $sanitize(html.join(''));

    function addText(text) {

      if (!text) {

        return;

      }

      html.push(sanitizeText(text));

    }

    function addLink(url, text) {

      var key, linkAttributes = attributesFn(url);

      html.push('<a ');

      for (key in linkAttributes) {

        html.push(key + '="' + linkAttributes[key] + '" ');

      }

      if (isDefined(target) && !('target' in linkAttributes)) {

        html.push('target="',

                  target,

                  '" ');

      }

      html.push('href="',

                url.replace(/"/g, '"'),

                '">');

      addText(text);

      html.push('</a>');

    }

  };

}]);

})(window, window.angular);